{"id":1106,"date":"2023-02-09T14:48:46","date_gmt":"2023-02-09T14:48:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/?p=1106"},"modified":"2023-02-09T15:19:30","modified_gmt":"2023-02-09T15:19:30","slug":"is-there-an-economic-and-political-cycle-in-social-spending-evidence-from-a-panel-of-argentine-provinces-for-1993-2020","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/is-there-an-economic-and-political-cycle-in-social-spending-evidence-from-a-panel-of-argentine-provinces-for-1993-2020\/","title":{"rendered":"\u00abIs there an economic and political cycle in social spending? Evidence from a panel of Argentine provinces for 1993-2020\u00bb"},"content":{"rendered":"

Los Ciclos de Presupuesto Pol\u00edtico (PBC) son rasgos fundamentales de los reg\u00edmenes democr\u00e1ticos.<\/p>\n

Los modelos te\u00f3ricos y la mayor parte de la literatura emp\u00edrica sostienen que los gobernantes oportunistas manipulan la pol\u00edtica fiscal para conservar el poder. Utilizando un panel de datos de los 24 distritos subnacionales argentinos, que abarcan el lapso 1993 – 2020, analizo el comportamiento del gasto social en a\u00f1os electorales y no electorales para todo el per\u00edodo y para diferentes subper\u00edodos.<\/p>\n

Adem\u00e1s, se explora el desempe\u00f1o de los subgrupos del gasto social, as\u00ed como los efectos partidistas. Las estimaciones de datos de panel din\u00e1mico confirman que el gasto social aumenta en a\u00f1os electorales, aunque existen diferencias sustanciales entre los subgrupos del gasto. A diferencia de Calvo y Murillo (2004) no se encontraron efectos partidistas en a\u00f1os electorales.<\/p>\n

Key words: social spending; subnational fiscal policy; opportunistic behavior; elections.<\/p>\n

JEL Classification: D72; P16.<\/p>\n

Autora: Mar\u00eda Ang\u00e9lica Tan Jun R\u00edos
\nDirector: Osvaldo Meloni<\/p>\n

Lee la tesis completa haciendo click aqu\u00ed<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Los Ciclos de Presupuesto Pol\u00edtico (PBC) son rasgos fundamentales de los reg\u00edmenes democr\u00e1ticos. Los modelos te\u00f3ricos y la mayor parte de la literatura emp\u00edrica sostienen que los gobernantes oportunistas manipulan la pol\u00edtica fiscal para conservar el poder. Utilizando un panel de datos de los 24 distritos subnacionales argentinos, que abarcan el lapso 1993 – 2020, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":123458,"featured_media":1107,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1106"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/123458"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1106"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1106\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1108,"href":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1106\/revisions\/1108"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1107"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1106"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1106"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/face.unt.edu.ar\/web\/ieconomia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1106"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}